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Abstract 
The global financial crisis in 2008 shows that the successive agreements Basel I, and II failed to stop the global 
financial collapse. Therefore, this research tries to answer the study question that; can Basel III enhancement give 
the banking sectors stability? Our data includes 324 listed from the largest banks across Middle East. Results from 
PLS-SEM analyses demonstrate bank risk is positive relationship related to charter value, information systems and 
Internal/External control systems. We find negative relationship among bank risk and market discipline. Following 
our finding, the result shows there is no relationship between bank risk and bank capital and the results suggest 
that Charter Value is the most important predictor of bank risk. 
Keywords:  Basel III, Bank Risk, Bank capital, charter value, information system, control system, market 
discipline, Middle East. 
 
1. Introduction 
The development of capital adequacy standard in banks came as a result of the growing sense that the fundamental 
issue in bank management – if not in the financial sector in general - is the issue of risk management. No doubt 
that risks in modern economy offers to trader’s opportunities and challenges alike. Basel accord III came as a result 
of this fact, by setting the risk issue in the lead, thus it reflected this general approach (Alfarra et al. 2016). Yet, 
the new recommendations are not just a revision or adjustment to Basel accord II by developing risk management 
methods, but include setting the concept of risk back to its natural scope which is the dependence on the market – 
as much as possible – in estimating these risks away from the random estimation. Basel III recommendations are 
not only a focus on risk management concept in general. But it also includes the restoration of the market’s role in 
estimating these risks (BCBS 2010 , Allen, Chan et al. 2012).  
(Sutorova and Teply 2014) their study consecrates to theory they describe the Basel III regulatory standards 
and discuss that this regulation is not appropriate and will not block financial markets from facing future crises. In 
addition, they studied the empirical analysis of the influence of capital requirements according to Basel III. They 
found that the regulation of Basel III maybe will influence negatively the bank shares on the finance market value 
of the observed banks. (Wang 2014) writes about the significant relationship between capital adequacy and the 
value of banks, contrary to derivatives. Wang found that variegated operational and magnified banks are positively 
correlated with bank’s values, leading to an increase in capital requirements and decrease in nonperforming loans, 
and finally resulting in the effectiveness of the economy.  
(Miles, Yang et al. 2013) investigate the cost and the benefits from having capital surpassing their assets loss-
absorbing capital or equity. In turn, the results have shown that banks are eligible to have capital higher than the 
capital requirement under Basel III. (Martin-Oliver, Ruano et al. 2013) investigate the new capital ratio according 
to Basel III impact on loans and interest rate for Spanish bank sector. The result has shown that the interest rate 
will increase through capital equity in the modified time as opposed to a stable situation. The new capital ratio 
according to Basel III is impacted by loans and interest rates for the Spanish bank sector. King examines a new 
Basel III liquidity among bank assets and liabilities.  
(Mamiza Haq a 2014) investigate the impact of bank capital, market discipline and charter value as bank 
disciplinary tools on both bank equity risk, and they found that bank risk is positively related to bank capital and 
negatively related to charter value. (Hadad, Agusman et al. 2011) examined the impact of these regulatory. They 
found that the weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the blanket guarantee scheme, which 
shows the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. In this research 
we develop model and investigate the effect of bank capital, charter value, information system, control system and 
market discipline on bank risk. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Bank capital 
For the previous twenty years and in special, following the global finance crisis, bank capital regulation and control 
have been the subject of deep debate, for policymaker and academics. Contemporary bank regulation modifications 
have firstly concentrated on modification the numerator of capital ratios, though changes to the modifications, i.e., 
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risk-weighted assets have been restricted (Le Leslé 2012, Mamiza Haq a 2014, Xue 2016, Alfarra 2016). Following 
(Rob 1999), and (Mamiza Haq a 2014)  bank risk might initially reduce with rise in bank capital, but as the capital 
buffer builds-up banks might finally select to rise their risk levels. So, the first hypothesis with respect to bank 
capital are as follows:  
Hypothesis H1: Bank risk initially decreases and then increases with bank capital. 
 
2.2 Charter value 
Charter value assistance to decrease the moral hazard issue in regarding to frank or implied safety net. Harmonious 
with this case, it is clear that the is a negative relationship among total risk and charter value (Fraser 2000, Konishi 
and Yasuda 2004). According to this discussion, it’s clear that the total risk has negative relationship with charter 
value, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk (Fraser 2000, Konishi and Yasuda 2004). On the other hand, several 
studies show that there is positive relationship among bank risk and charter value. Likelihood, this outcome as 
indicator for charter value chances to increase. We tendency more to (Mamiza Haq a 2014) and (Hellmann, 
Murdock et al. 2000) theoretical and experimental, results of (Tina M. Galloway 1997), and us expect that charter 
value decrease bank risk. So, the second hypothesis with respect to bank capital is as follows: 
Hypothesis H2. An increase in charter value lead to an increase in Bank risk decreases 
 
2.3 Information systems  
In nowadays, information system is playing a very significant role in banking sectors. The management 
information system (MIS)  has several definitions such as a combination of hardware, software, infrastructure and 
trained personnel organized to facilitate planning, control, coordination, and decision making in an organization 
(Eastburn and Boland 2015). Recently we have seen numerous occurrences of information security incidents, many 
of which involved with the attempts to acquire banking information for illegal profits and hence lead to increased 
business risk and lost revenues(Elisabeta JABA 2016, Mandal and Bagchi 2016). Therefore, the authors argue 
about the relationship among information system and bank risk. So, our third testable hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
Hypothesis H3. Bank risk decreases with develop Information systems. 
 
2.4 Control systems  
The banks use an advanced group of information technologies for upholding their management control systems 
and allowing to observe by government supervisors and business overseers (Eastburn and Boland 2015). Banks 
rely on an international system of data processing and information systems to offer their essential banking facilities 
and to manage the ganglion financial and macroeconomic basics of their environment (Li, Yang et al. 2016). The 
internal and external auditing considered as a lifeline for banks managers.  It helps banking achieve its purposes 
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to assess and improve the efficiency of risk management, control, 
and governance. Therefore, our forth testable hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis H4. Bank risk decreases with increasing internal and external control. 
 
2.5 Market discipline 
The term of market discipline in banking sector refers to the situation where the private segment agents such as 
stockholders, depositors or creditors undertake different costs that are magnified by banking practices followed by 
banks that require taking additional risk, henceforth, the private sector agents have to take further actions while 
considering these costs (Mamiza Haq a 2014, Schmaltz, Pokutta et al. 2014). For instance, banks maybe punish 
by increase the interest rates if they haven’t insured depositors like subordinated debt holders, how are uncovered 
bank risk-taking, which led to withdrawing deposits (Adrian, Covitz et al. 2015). Therefore, banks with great of 
subordinated debt are probable to display lesser levels of equity risk (Chen, Yen et al. 2015, Guochen PAN 2016, 
Ngalawa, Tchana et al. 2016). BCBS committee said that if the bank hasn’t obligated in a specific level of risk, 
and the subordinated loan maybe face higher risk than the deposit insurance regime. So, the fifth hypothesis with 
respect to Market discipline is as follows: 
Hypothesis H5. An increase in market discipline, a decrease in bank risk. 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Data collication  
This research uses data consists of 14 banks (Arab Bank, Cairo Amman Bank, Bank of Jordan, Housing bank for 
trade & finance, Jordan Commercial Bank, Jordan Kuwait Bank, Jordan Ahli Bank, Egyptian Arab Land Bank, 
H.S.B.C, Bank of Palestine, Commercial Bank, Arab Islamic Bank, Bank of Jerusalem, and The National Bank) 
across Middle East countries.  
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3.2 Empirical  Models 
This research tests the hypotheses through investigate the relationship among bank risk (BR) as independent 
variable and several independent variables following this model: 
 !" = $ + $% &" + $ '&( " + $)*," + $-&, " +  $ ./0 " + 1  (1) 
 
where BR is bank risk, BC is bank capital, CV is Charter value, IS is information system, CS control system, MD 
market discipline. All this variable we will investigate them as dependent variables using sub models as follow: 
The model for bank capital is as follows:  
 !" = $ + 2%&34" + 2' !!" + 2)*5*" + 2-&!/" + 2./&!" + 26!7!" 
+ 280&4" + 29&/!" + 2:,/&" + 2%; *4!" + 2%% <,>" + 1  
(2) 
 
where CGP is credit risk goals and procedures, BRR is bank responsible for revising the financial results, IXE is 
internal and external environment of the bank, CRM is executive credit risk management, MCR is measure and 
control risks, RFR is revising the financial results regularly, DCP is development of credit policies of the bank, 
CMR is credit risk management and the responsibility, SM is separates between measuring and controlling credit 
risk, IPR is identifying and analyzing the potential risks and QSE is qualified staff with sufficient experience. 
 &" = $ + 2%&3&" + 2'&!4" + 2)&>&" + 2-&!3" + 2.&4?" + 2644?" 
+ 28>@4" + 29>/4" + 2:0 0" + 2%; &40" + 2%% ,!4" + 1  
(3) 
 
where CGC is credit granting criteria, CRP is credit risk policies, CEC is changes to economic conditions, CRG is 
Credit risk guarantees, CPA is customer’s periodic assessment’, PPA is portfolio periodic assessment’, ELP is the 
expected losses in the portfolio, EMP is the efficiency of monetary policy, DBD is deal with bad debts, CPD is 
Credit portfolio diversification, SRP is Sensitive risk pricing. 
For charter value (CV) the model we will use as follow: 
&(" = $ + 2%@&!" + 2'@A&" + 2)*&!" + 2-@<*" + 2.0!B" + 260C," 
+ 28?*B" + 1  
(4) 
 
where LNR is local credit rating, LCR is The limited number of customers classified, ICR is internal credit rating 
systems, LQI is low quality of credit information, DRT is disclosure requirements and transparency, DHS is 
Develop human capacities and skills, AIT is advanced information technology. 
To investigate information system (IS) we will use the model below:  
*," = $ + 2%!*" + 2'&4" + 2)/0," + 2-**," + 2.>/!" + 1  (5) 
 
where RI is reliability of information, CP is credit portfolio, CEC is Data of information management systems, IIS 
is internal information systems, EMR is Efficiency to manage credit risks. 
We will investigate control system (CS) as follow: 
&," = $ + D $"
E
"F'
2"*?" + 2'5?" + 1"    (6)  
 
where CS is dependent variable and both internal auditing IA and external auditing XA are independents variables. 
Then we will use sub models to investigate IA and XA. The sub models as follow: 
*?" = $ + 2%>*?" + 2'**?" + 2)>&/" + 2-04!" + 2.@&!" + 260G&"
+ 280>4" + 290&>" + 2: ?*!" + 1" 
 
(7) 
 
where EIA is effective internal audit, IIA is Independent internal audit, ECM is evaluating credit management, 
DPR is determines the accuracy of credit portfolio risks, LCR is limiting credit risks, DWR is determine points of 
weakness in credit risk, DEP is determining any exceptions in the procedures, DCE is Detecting credit 
deterioration at an early stage, AIR is Assessment of the level and trends of credit risk. 
5?" = $ + 2%*>!" + 2'0> " + 2)AB&" + 2-0!*" + 2.??/" + 26/?4" 
+ 28& H" + 29?&?" + 2: ,!!" + 1" 
(8) 
 
where IER is independent evaluation to the bank risk, DEB is determining the efficiency of board members in 
credit risk management, NTC is necessary review to the types of credit, DRI is depends on the results of the internal 
audit, AAM is assesses the ability of bank’s management, MAP is monitors the aspects of the credit portfolio, CBU 
is Control the bank for urgent improvement of credit risk management, ACA is assesses the adequacy of bank 
capital compared to credit risk, SRR is sets restrictions to limit risks. 
The market discipline (MD) model we will use as follow: 
/0" = $ + 2%04" + 2'47!" + 2)??@" + 2-?4?" + 2.//!" + 26B,!" + 1" (9) 
 
where DP is disclosure policy, PER is periodic financial performance reports, AAL is assessing the assets and 
liabilities of the bank, APA is accounting policies applied, MMR is applied methods in managing and measuring 
credit risk, TSR is periodic disclosure includes type and size of credit risk. 
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4.  Analysis and Results  
4.1 Plan analysis 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) using the partial least squares (PLS) method was used to answer the research 
questions. In an external model, PLS analysis is used to estimate latent variables (LVs) based on the shared variance 
of observed variables, using the principal-component weights of the observed variables. 
PLS analysis. The measurement model shows how each block of items relates to its construct or latent 
variable. The PLS results indicate that a satisfactory level of convergent validity was achieved, based on certain 
criteria. As shown in Table 1, all of the item loadings were greater than 0.70 (all significant, p < 0.001), with the 
exception of the item measuring BankRis, BankCap, and Charter whose loading was lower than the 0.70 threshold. 
However, this item was retained for the following two reasons. (1) According to (Chin 1998), a loading below the 
threshold is acceptable if the loadings of other items measuring the same construct are high. (2) The loading was 
still higher than the cutoff point of 0.4 recommended by some scholars (Hulland 1999). Discriminant validity is 
verified by measuring the difference between a construct’s average variance extracted (AVE) value and its 
correlations with other constructs. To achieve a sufficiently high level of discriminant validity, the square root of 
the construct’s AVE should be greater than its correlations with all other constructs (Kock 2012). As shown in 
Table 2, the threshold for discriminant validity was also exceeded. 
Table 1 Combined loadings and cross-loadings 
Variables BankRis BankCap Charter DevIS IntCont ExtCont MarketD 
CGP -0.798 -0.133 -0.047 -0.108 -0.135 0.284 -0.061 
RRR -0.848 0.126 0.02 0.055 -0.048 0.166 0.211 
IXE 0.845 0.004 -0.009 -0.104 0.186 0.046 -0.113 
CRM -0.861 0.097 0.074 -0.229 0.104 -0.009 -0.048 
MCR 0.706 -0.173 0.073 -0.121 0.071 0.011 -0.119 
RFR 0.611 0.089 -0.099 -0.103 -0.022 -0.011 -0.144 
CGC -0.085 0.906 0.037 -0.016 0.062 0.035 -0.053 
CRP -0.095 0.894 0.032 0.003 0.067 0.07 -0.041 
CEC -0.14 -0.831 -0.094 0.081 0.106 0.094 -0.232 
CRG 0.15 -0.871 -0.031 0.006 0.078 0.02 -0.013 
CPA 0.152 0.902 -0.005 0.034 -0.218 -0.073 0.004 
PPA -0.13 -0.904 0.075 0.022 0.204 -0.072 -0.041 
ELP -0.024 -0.931 0.093 0.049 -0.06 0.042 0.078 
EMP -0.151 -0.809 0.008 0.117 0.029 0.027 -0.073 
DBD 0.01 -0.723 0.072 -0.219 -0.104 0.022 -0.118 
CPD 0.264 -0.746 0.011 -0.228 -0.131 0.079 -0.033 
SRP -0.133 -0.855 0.025 -0.04 0.156 0.128 0.007 
CGS -0.146 -0.843 0.096 0.022 0.064 0.026 -0.16 
LCR -0.119 0.125 0.852 0.11 0.079 -0.025 0.013 
LNC 0.265 0.017 -0.647 0.448 -0.086 0.11 -0.058 
ICR 0.042 0.054 0.688 -0.009 0.105 -0.014 0.016 
LQI -0.004 -0.003 0.991 0.022 -0.027 0.005 0.007 
DRT 0.029 -0.012 0.984 0.025 0.011 0.008 -0.01 
DHS 0.017 0.006 0.992 0.015 -0.01 0.006 -0.008 
RI -0.114 0.042 0.028 0.699 0.162 -0.038 -0.09 
CP -0.007 -0.039 0.112 -0.626 0.144 0.118 0.033 
DMS 0.019 -0.153 0.176 0.683 -0.021 -0.029 0.126 
IIS 0.081 0.063 0.106 0.659 -0.042 -0.056 -0.188 
EMR 0.097 -0.031 -0.014 0.709 -0.064 0.121 0.091 
EIA -0.089 -0.006 0.194 -0.051 0.65 -0.009 0.111 
IIA 0.009 -0.027 0.124 0 -0.653 -0.015 0.109 
ECM 0.03 -0.212 -0.005 -0.112 0.682 -0.096 -0.165 
APR 0.097 -0.183 -0.036 0.116 0.605 -0.069 -0.082 
LCR -0.152 0.055 0.148 0.02 -0.705 -0.104 -0.007 
DWC 0.259 0.083 -0.067 0.109 -0.711 0.102 0.006 
IER -0.329 -0.123 -0.006 -0.165 -0.105 0.637 -0.084 
DEB -0.009 -0.065 0.076 0.137 0.086 0.689 0.067 
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Variables BankRis BankCap Charter DevIS IntCont ExtCont MarketD 
RTC -0.037 0.049 0.107 -0.105 0.074 0.65 0.161 
DRI 0.001 0.2 0.134 0.002 0.048 -0.764 0.117 
AAM -0.034 0.003 -0.003 0.067 0.134 -0.604 0.202 
MAP -0.181 -0.021 0.113 -0.148 0.06 -0.643 0.097 
DP -0.115 -0.055 0.079 -0.039 0.024 -0.028 0.799 
PER 0.108 0.163 0.016 -0.091 0.004 -0.002 0.736 
AAL 0.035 -0.048 -0.041 -0.045 -0.086 0.006 -0.636 
MMR 0.061 0.039 -0.037 0.088 0.105 -0.024 0.778 
TSR 0.028 0.106 -0.048 -0.029 0.101 0.126 -0.729 
Notes: Factor loadings greater than 0.40 are shown in boldface.  
 
Table 2 Correlations among latent variables with square roots of AVEs, Latent variable coefficients window 
 Bankris BankCap Charter Develop IntCont ExContr MarketD InExCon 
Bankris 0.844 0.092 0.054 0.125 0.07 0.071 -0.048 0.018 
BankCap 0.092 0.754 0.078 0.062 0.287 0.059 -0.06 0.106 
Charter 0.054 0.078 0.647 0.098 0.034 0.132 0.025 0.085 
Develop 0.125 0.062 0.098 0.716 0.156 -0.008 -0.06 0.022 
IntCont 0.07 0.287 0.034 0.156 0.698 0.074 -0.077 0.435 
ExContr 0.071 0.059 0.132 -0.008 0.074 0.854 0.088 0.462 
MarketD -0.048 -0.06 0.025 -0.06 -0.077 0.088 0.789 0.791 
InExCon 0.018 0.106 0.085 0.022 0.435 0.462 0.791 0.788 
Notes: Square roots of average variances extracted (AVEs) shown in diagonal. 
The hypotheses were assessed by examining the parameters of the PLS structural model. The R2 values 
obtained for dependent variables indicate the predictive power of a theoretical model, and standardized path 
coefficients indicate the strength of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The results 
are shown in Fig. 1 and Table 3. The R2 value of 0.77 indicates that the theoretical model explained a substantial 
amount of the variance in Bank Risk. In addition, the model accounted for 77% of the variance in RE. As the R2 
of a dependent variable must be at least 10% to ensure meaningful interpretation, the theoretical model 
demonstrated substantive explanatory power. Table 4 is demonstrating the effects of the independent variables on 
dependent variable BR which referring that the best predictor of Bank risk is MD with 0.115 coefficient, while the 
second effective variable is information system & control system with 0.112 coefficient. More plus, the results 
discover that there is no significant effect of bank capital on bank risk.  
Figure 1 depicts the final structural model. The path coefficients can be taken as standardized beta weights, 
each of which was estimated after controlling for the effects of all of the other paths. To determine whether each 
path was significant, bootstrapping resampling (Gong 1983) was performed. The PLS parameters of a series of 
random subsamples of the total sample were repeatedly tested until significance could be estimated from the 
convergent finding. 
 
4.2 Main Results  
As shown in Fig. 1 and Table 5, the results suggest that CharterV is the most important predictor of BankRisk 
(17%) in terms of both status and quality, compared with MarketD (11.5%), InExCon (11.2%) and 
DevelopI(11.2%) . Our results show that BankRisk is positively related to CharterV (p < 0.01), supporting H2. We 
also find support for H4 (p < 0.01), according to which InEXcon is positively moderated the BankRisk. H5 is also 
supported (p < 0.01), as our results demonstrate that an increase in MarketD leads to an increase in BankRisk. 
Findings shows that H3 is supported as reports show that DevelopI is positively related to BankRisk(p < 0.05). As 
results shows, H1 is rejected, indicating that there is no relationship between BankCapi and BankRisk.  Also, results 
demonstrate that the BankRisk would be increasing as CharterV, InExcont and DevelopI lift, while with an 
increase in MarketDi the BankRisk will decrease.      
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Average path coefficient (APC)=0.288, P<0.001     
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.339, P<0.001    
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.032, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3  
Average full collinearity VIF (AFVIF)=3.051, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3 
Tenenhaus GoF (GoF)=0.487, small >= 0.1, medium >= 0.25, large >= 0.36  
Sympson's paradox ratio (SPR)=1.000, acceptable if >= 0.7, ideally = 1  
R-squared contribution ratio (RSCR)=1.000, acceptable if >= 0.9, ideally = 1 
Statistical suppression ratio (SSR)=0.878, acceptable if >= 0.7   
Nonlinear bivariate causality direction ratio (NLBCDR)=0.933, acceptable if >= 0.7 
Figure 1 Model fit and quality indices 
 
Table 3 Path coefficients  
 Bank Capital Charter V Develop IS Market D InExCon 
Bank risk 0.068b 0.265a 0.096a -0.139a 0.13a 
                            Note:  
                            *All hypotheses were evaluated using two-tail tests.  
                                                 a p < 0.01.  
                                                 b p < 0.1 
 
5. Discussion  
Results reject the relationship of bank risk with bank capital. Though (NICOL´O 2005) argue that increase bank 
capital might increases total risk, we didn’t find similar relationship. Actually previous findings on the relationship 
of bank capital and bank risk is quite equivocal while we find no relationship. It means that with changing in bank 
risk there is no significant change in the risks that banks in middle east are dealing with.   
The analysis result concerning the relationship among charter value and bank risk, figure 1 has been shown 
a positive relationship. This support the second hypotheses (H2). An increase in charter value leads to an increase 
in Bank risk. Our result is same with (Hellmann, Murdock et al. 2000) which they found the positive relationship 
among charter value and bank risk. However, our result is different with (Mamiza Haq a 2014) that argue the bank 
charter value  decreases bank risk including equity risk, credit risk, and default risk. (Fraser 2000) argue that the 
charter value has a negative relationship with total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk.  
In addition, the PLS analysis shows that the relationship between the information system and bank risk is 
positive, which it contrasts to the orientation of H3.  In general bank risk increases with developing Information 
systems, while our results are contradicting with general idea of safe securing of risk by promoting information 
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system. However, this result is the same as (Chen, Yen et al. 2015), that argue many bank risks ‘incidents result 
from inadequate protection of information assets. (Marshall 2010) Which argue that the negative impact of develop 
the information system on data integrity consequences of financial institutions will be an endless degradation of 
sensitive commercial and personal financial information due to internet hackers access to unsecure financial 
systems online if cyber-crimes using technology bombs. While (Abdolvand, Albadvi et al. 2015), said that the 
efficient information system can reveal which customers combination can pinpoint profitable and default.  
With regard to fourth hypotheses, the result in figure 1 has shown the positive relationship among 
(internal/external) control system (CS) and bank risk, which it contrasts to the orientation of fourth hypothesis 
(H4). Bank risk increases with increasing internal and external control. The analysis shows !' = 0.33, it means 
strong relation. As previous researches indicate that CEO overconfidence can explain the cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior among banks(Ho, Huang et al. 2016, Huang, Tan et al. 2016), our results 
demonstrate that the Bank’s CEO overconfidence lead to perceiving a secure condition due to their investment in 
internal-external control system, which in fact, it is a source of overinvestment and outflows of bank resources. 
That could increase the total bank risk.  
With regard to fifth hypotheses, PLS analysis has shown that there is negative relationship among the market 
discipline and bank risk. We can observe the result in Fig.1, which it is, support the H5. An increase in market 
discipline, a decrease in bank risk. This  result have similarity with (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2004), (Nier 
and Baumann 2006), (Goyal 2005), and (Cubillas, Fonseca et al. 2012) find that bank crises generally weaken 
market discipline as depositors anticipate stronger implicit guarantees in the future (Mamiza Haq a 2014). While, 
(Martinez Peria 2001) and.(Hadad, Agusman et al. 2011), founds that the demonstrate that depositors discipline 
banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rate after crises This result is different with several 
empirical studies such as Hasan, (Hasan, Jackowicz et al. 2013), which argue that the market discipline supporting 
the hypothesis that market discipline is at work. Our findings have been shown that the market discipline is one of 
the important factors on bank risk, which is support Basel III to introduce market discipline as a pillar of prudential 
banking regulation. 
Table 4 Effect sizes for path coefficients 
 Bank Capital Charter V Develop IS Market D InExCon 
Bank risk 0.007 0.17** 0.112** 0.115** 0.112** 
*Small effect, ** Medium effect, ***Large effect 
 
Table 5 The sum of direct and indirect effect of LV on Performance 
 Bank Capital Charter V Develop IS Market D InExCon 
Bank risk 0.007b 0.17a 0.012a 0.115a 0.112a 
                             a p < 0.01.  
                              b p < 0.1. 
 
6. Conclusion   
This research investigates bank capital, cheater value, information system, internal & external control system and 
market discipline on bank risk. The results show that bank risk is positively related to control system, charter value, 
information systems, but negative related to market discipline. Also the result show that there is no relationship 
among bank capital and bank risk. This result is different with (Mamiza Haq a 2014) which argue that there is no 
evidence of a non-linearity between bank capital and bank risk.  Although Basel I, II and III make attention to 
capital adequacy, the result showed that the charter value, & market discipline are the most important factors on 
bank risk. 
We have the same result with (Mamiza Haq a 2014) that there is negative relationship among charter value 
and bank risk. Which means the value of a bank able to continue to do business in the future, reflected as a part of 
its share price. But we have different result with (Fraser 2000) and (Konishi and Yasuda 2004) argues that the 
charter value has a negative relationship with total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. However, our result 
is different with (Hellmann, Murdock et al. 2000), they found positive relationship among charter value and bank 
risk.  
With regard of information system, the results show there is positive relationship among develop the 
information system and bank risk. However, this result is the same as (Chen, Yen et al. 2015), that argue many 
bank risks ‘incidents result from inadequate protection of information assets. (Marshall 2010)  Which argue that 
the negative impact of develop the information system on data integrity consequences of financial institutions will 
be an endless degradation of sensitive commercial and personal financial information due to internet hackers access 
to unsecure financial systems online if cyber-crimes using technology bombs. Moreover, the result show there is 
positive relationship among (internal/external) control system (CS) and bank risk. As previous researches indicate 
that CEO overconfidence can explain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior among banks, our 
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results demonstrate that the Bank’s CEO overconfidence lead to perceiving a secure condition due to their 
investment in internal/external control system, which in fact, it is a source of overinvestment and outflows of bank 
resources. In addition, our result show there is negative relationship among the market discipline and bank risk. 
Our result the same with Mamiza Haq. et. al  which argue that the market discipline is found to be negatively 
associated with bank risk. But it has deferent with Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, Nier & Baumann and Cubillas 
et al  find that bank crises generally weaken market discipline as depositors anticipate stronger implicit guarantees 
in the future. 
In general, the charter value and market discipline are playing very significant rule on bank risk. Therefore, 
the result answers the research question through support Basel III and make attention to charter value and market 
discipline.  Thus, this study significant to all that have anxiety of bank risk. 
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